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This paper develops a critical understanding of the smart city by investigating the values and ideas that 
underpin this concept and how they are translated into practice. It suggests that, despite private 
companies and municipalities promoting the smart city as a revolutionary utopia, this utopia is, on the 
contrary, an expression of the neoliberal ideology. The case study of the Italian city of Genoa shows that 
the smart city utopia acts as a generator of a collective imaginary while promoting the interests of business 
elites and diverting the attention away from urgent urban problems, such as urbanization. The neoliberal 
ideology influences the framing of these problems by favoring business-led technological solutions rather 
than political and long-term urban planning. The study suggests that this business-led utopia has important 
implications in terms of accountability of the actors involved.   
 




There is a high level of agreement in the literature that there is as yet no common definition of a smart city 
(Cocchia, 2014; Baron, 2012; Caragliu et al., 2011; Angelidou, 2014; Neirotti et al., 2014). The increasing 
diffusion of models, standards and definitions of smart city creates ambiguity and makes it difficult to 
estimate to what extent the existing smart cities keep up with the expectations and the ideals claimed by 
the promoters of this paradigm (Anthopoulos, 2016).  
 
Overall, the IT dimension appears central to the smart city (Carvalho, 2015; Mora et al., 2017) and the 
advocates of this urban paradigm highlight the benefits resulting from the adoption of technologies, 
techniques and visions, granting that these are “scientific, objective, commonsensical and apolitical” in 
nature (Kitchin, 2014, 132). According to IBM (2011, 2), a smart city is an “interconnected, instrumented 
and intelligent” city. The “smartness” of a city seems related to its capability of providing infrastructures 
and services that improve the lives of its citizens (Cretu, 2012). Pamula et al. (2013) define the smart city as 
a solution to problems such as aging of social infrastructure, CO2 emissions and urbanization. Meijer and 
Bolívar (2015) identify three constitutive elements of the smart city: smart technology, smart people and 
smart collaboration. 
 
A growing critical literature has countered these optimistic rhetoric and largely celebratory tones (Hollands, 
2015; Hollands, 2008; Greenfield, 2013; Vanolo, 2013; Kitchin, 2014; Marvin et al., 2015). Adopting a critical 
standpoint, this literature has analyzed the smart city as an expression of a neoliberal and market-led 
restructuring process of the urban space (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; Brenner and Theodore, 2002b; 
Hollands, 2008; Peck and Tickell, 2002). The diffusion of new models of local governance based upon 
privatization and public-private partnerships, the exposure of municipalities to global competition, and the 
mobilization of an entrepreneurial ethos and discourse are among the most important traits of this 
“neoliberalization” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002b, 353) process. The literature has raised concerns about 
the growing role of private corporations in defining and making-up the smart city, thus alternately labelling 
the smart city as a “corporate smart city” (Hollands, 2015, 2), a “private city” (Adams, 2010, 6), and an 
“entrepreneurial city” (Harvey, 1989). Critical studies suggest that this business-driven development of 
smart city might result in a prioritization of business goals over social and economic ones, thus leading to 
social polarization and inequality (Brenner and Theodore, 2002b; Hollands, 2008).  
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In line with previous studies (Anthopoulos, 2016; Angelidou, 2015; Ahvenniemi et al., 2017; Meijer and 
Bolívar, 2015), this paper tries to clarify the characteristics and ideas underpinning the smart city vision, 
with the belief that more critical reflection on the topic is needed (Marvin et al., 2015). The paper suggests 
that, despite private corporations and cities promoting the smart city as a revolutionary utopia, this 
paradigm is an expression of the neoliberal ideology. By developing a brief case study of Genoa, this study 
tries to support the theoretical points with empirical evidence - thus addressing a shortcoming of the 
critical literature, which requires more engagement with empirical research (Kitchin, 2014).  
 
The paper is logically structured in five sections, with the next section (section 2) explaining the main 
concepts of our critical discourse (utopia and ideology) and contextualizing them within the ongoing debate 
on smart cities. Section 3 provides insights into the critical hermeneutics methodology adopted. Section 4 
provides a brief case analysis of the smart city of Genoa and Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Utopia and the neoliberal ideology 
 
 
The word utopia is from the Greek οὐ ("not") and τόπος ("place "), and it refers to an imaginary perfect 
place. The book of Deuteronomy offers a first example of the symbolic power of this conceptual construct. 
The book narrates that God did not allow Moses to enter the Promised Land, the prophet could only see it 
from a distance. The description of the Promised Land recalls the garden of the Eden and the apocalyptic 
vision “Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, 
and the sea was no more” (Revelation 21:1). The Promised Land is described as the direction, the telos in 
the form of future/place to which humanity should strive and aspire. The act of seeing symbolizes an 
overcoming of space and time, the imagination of a world alternative to the existent. Utopia refers to this 
imaginary capacity that guides man’s actions and aspirations. 
 
In 1516, a book by Sir Thomas More uses the term utopia to describe an ideal island in which legal, political 
and economic systems allowed its community to live in harmony and in peace. Since then, the term utopia 
has been used to describe an imaginary project alternative to the existing social order, an ideal model of 
society (Campanella, 1602). The description of the State offered by Plato in the Republic can be considered 
one of the first examples of utopia (Hertzler, 1923) in the sense of a practicable and desirable (δυνατάτε 
και βέλτιστα) model. It is by virtue of this possibility and desirability, that utopia has a revolutionary power. 
In this sense, the Marxist E. Bloch (1995) distinguishes the “abstract utopia” from the “concrete utopia”, 
the latter referring to a project connected with reality that leads citizens forward into historical 
transformation and social revolution. 
 
In recent decades, the concept of concrete utopia has been used to define the smart city initiatives 
(Söderström et al. 2014; Wiig, 2015; Datta, 2015; Watson, 2013; Vanolo, 2016; Marvin et al., 2015; 
Anthopoulos, 2016). On one hand, the advocates of this paradigm (public, private and not-for profit actors) 
describe the smart city as “a concrete utopia in an urban space at human scale” (Genoa Smart City 
Association, GSCA). It is common to read in newspapers slogans such us “welcome to the city of Utopia…in 
Florence, city of the digital Renaissance” (Ferrara, 2014) and “the notion of smart city has been attractive 
as a concrete utopia” (Il Sole 24 ORE, 2014). The reference to utopia is clearly stated: “The major point of 
contact with the idea of smart cities is however in the New Atlantis of Bacon […] In this city, science is 
sovereign” (Fuggetta, 2012). The description of smart city as a “common vision that provides citizens, 
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business, and institutions with a ‘high-level’ goal on which to base potential sacrifices” (ABB, 2012, 37) 
reveals the eschatological character of this utopia.   
 
On the other hand, critical studies suggest that, when translated into practice, the smart city utopia often 
conflicts with its aspirations. Wiig (2015) explains that a disconnection exists between the smart city 
concept and the translation of public policies into practice. Thus, “techno-utopian smart city solutions” 
(Wiig, 2015, 260) might become rhetorical devices mobilized to divert the attention away from the real 
problems of the citizenship. In the same vein, Watson (2013) suggests that there is a sharp contrast 
between the image of African cities boosted by the smart city rhetoric and the actual conditions of the 
population, the results of these fantasies being instead increasing social inequalities and marginalization. 
 
This paper argues that a dialectic exists between utopia and ideology due to the inner connection of utopia 
to “authority and control” (Harvey, 2000, 163). The emergence of a utopia over alternative visions fixes a 
specific moral order (Vanolo, 2013; Harvey, 2000) and might lead to the transformation of utopia into 
ideology, the latter being an “imaginary transposition of the real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1971). 
Ideology describes “a negative sense of illusory self-understanding which helps a dominant class to sustain 
and reproduce its power and control” (Nørreklit et al., 2006). Ideologies have a practical impact on daily life 
insofar as they produce a collective imaginary that reinforces existing systems of social domination while 
preventing the production of alternative imaginaries (Eagleton, 1996; Van Dijk, 1998). This paper suggests 
that the smart city utopia is a fundamental facet of the neoliberal contemporary ideology (Kornberger and 
Carter, 2010; Hackworth, 2007).  
 
Neoliberalism is a macro-logical concept difficult to outline due to its hybrid character. Indeed, 
neoliberalism is never found in a pure form, but it is always mediated by the historical, economic and social 
context in which it emerges (Peck, 2013). A contrast may then exist between neoliberal ideology and 
“actual existing neoliberalism” (Peck, 2013, 146). This paper focuses on the ways in which the assumptions 
underpinning the neoliberal ideology have influenced the formulation of the smart city utopia and its 
translation into practice.  
 
Fostered in the political arena by Thatcher and Reagan in the ‘80s, neoliberalism makes his appearance in 
the field of city government with the proposal of market mechanisms and managerialism as solutions to 
urban problems (Kornberger and Carter, 2010; Harvey, 2005). In this specific setting, neoliberalization 
assumes the public ‘goodness’ of privatization, lean government and deregulation through the 
implementation of “competitive regimes of resource allocation” (Peck and Tickell, 2002, 394). The value of 
competitiveness, and the related managerial tool of performance measurement, play a fundamental role in 
the neoliberal ideology (Kornberger and Carter, 2010; Santangelo, 2016), thus becoming a constitutive 
element of the smart city utopia. Kornberger and Carter (2010) suggest that the diffusion of city rankings 
that measure the “smartness” of cities is an example of the disciplinary and normalizing power of 
neoliberalism to generate competition among cities by transforming their differences in deviances from a 
norm of smartness assumed to be the best practices. Another example is the Smart Cities Stakeholder 
Platform initiated by the European Commission (Smart City Project, 2013) which places the urban paradigm 
of smart city at the centre of European policies for the coming years. The availability of European financial 
resources earmarked for smart cities projects strongly impacts the allocation policies of cities hit by the 
economic crisis (Cocchia, 2014) and expose them to international competition.  
 
This process of “neoliberalization of the urban space” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002b) has also led to the 
diffusion of “‘networked’ forms of governance based upon public–private partnerships; ‘new public 
management’ strategies; privatization and competitive contracting of municipal services” (Guarneros-Meza 
et al., 2010, 116). A key idea of this neoliberal restructuring of the public sector is that governments are no 
 4 
longer called upon to govern, command and control but to “steer” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, 46). 
Accordingly, the underlying assumption of the smart city paradigm is that “solving societal problems is not 
merely a question of developing good policies but much more a managerial question of organizing strong 
collaboration between government and other stakeholders” (Meijer and Bolívar, 2015,3).  
 
According to the critical scholars of the neoliberal ideology (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; Guarneros-
Meza and Geddes, 2010), there is an increasing concentration of urban power in the hands of a few 
political and business elites in European cities (Blanco, 2015, 124). The financial austerity measures 
imposed upon cities force them to rely more and more on private and local sources of revenue (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002b). This results in the adoption of a profit-oriented approach and in an increasing 
involvement of private actors, holders of innovation and technological knowledge. This involvement raises 
relevant issues (Hollands, 2015; Vanolo, 2014). First, it results in an increasing call for technological 
solutions, even when something very different is needed (Hollands, 2015; Taylor, 1991, 6). Second, this 
business-led development of smart city leads to a “corporate vision of smartness” (Hollands, 2015, 2) and 
to the primacy of the economic logic over political and social issues. Urban development itself risks to be 
driven by profit seeking: “like businesses, cities also have to be resilient and able to generate revenues” 
(Rayner, 2015). Thus, the impact of the smart city is often expressed in monetary terms: 
 
“A ‘smarter’ country is worth up to 10 points in GDP annually.” (ABB, 2012) 
 
There are clear steps that cities can take, such as getting assistance in leading projects, 
improving planning, and achieving a better understanding of the cost and benefits of a 
smart city. As they undertake the steps recommended here, they can move beyond the 
current barriers and start to capitalize on the benefits of a smart city. (Cisco, 2014; 
emphasis added) 
 
Finally, this neoliberal-based smart city utopia may lead to a privatization of decision-making and an 
exercise of power insulated from democratic accountability (Swyngedouw, 2005). As observed by Lehman 
(1999, 234), “it seems that the community’s environmental and social relationships are deferred to 
corporations, all competing in a deregulated and increasingly transnational market place.” Thus, within the 
smart city paradigm, “no longer would government be the sole monopoly provider […] private purveyors 
would create competition for government service delivery contracts – bringing a market into public service 
delivery”(Warner, 2012, 538). Given their great influence on public policies, “city leaders are also 
accountable and should be held accountable in the pursuit of the status of ‘smart city” (Glasmeier 
and Christopherson, 2015, 10). This neoliberal marketization of the public sphere challenges the traditional 
mechanisms of democratic accountability enacted through the ballot box and political representation 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002b), insofar as the private actors leading the way towards the smart city are 
not democratically elected (Vanolo, 2014). 
 
 3. Method and methodology 
 
Building on Habermas (1971), this study proposes critical hermeneutics as a valuable methodology for 
unmasking ideology. Hermeneutics is the use of interpretation to explain an object of study (Taylor, 1985). 
It originally referred to the discipline of interpreting biblical and ancient classics, with the aim of grasping 
the underlying meanings of texts, moving from the parts to the whole (Alvesson and Skllowing, 2009). This 
process leads to a “hermeneutical circle” as interpretation requires a movement back and forth between 
the parts and the whole of the text to deepen the overall understanding (Thompson, 1990).  
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With Ricoeur (1986), Habermas places hermeneutics at the center of critical social science, the goal of 
which is emancipation by means of a critique of ideology (Dyer, 2010). Our study develops a critique of 
smart city ideology that shows “the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of 
domination” (Thompson, 1990, p. 56). Differing from prior hermeneutical approaches (Gadamer, 2004), a 
critical hermeneutics or “depth hermeneutics” (Habermas, 1971, p. 218) attempts to reveal, through a 
process of understanding, systems of distortion (Ricoeur, 1986) and structural deformation of 
communication (Habermas, 1971). 
 
Language produces and conveys ideology, ideology implying a “structural deformation of communication” 
(Habermas, 1971). Thus, language can be partaken of or used by institutional power to dominate: 
 
Language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimate relations of 
organized power. Insofar as the legitimation of power relations … are not articulated … language is 
also ideological (Habermas, 1990, p. 239). 
 
Consequently, we conceive languages not as formal transcendental structures, but in specific historical 
contexts (Thompson, 1984), as “social philosophies, penetrated by a system of values inseparable from 
living practice and class struggle” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 470). 
 
We suggest that only an interpretative circle that enriches meta-narratives of smart city with the 
complexity of real cities, and interpret these cities in the light of the above theoretical explanations and 
conceptualizations may grasp the meaning of the smart city paradigm. This hermeneutic approach requires 
that, in our understanding of the smart city paradigm, we analyse the narrative of smart city and its role in 
sustain the neoliberal ideology. Hence, this study supports the theoretical arguments described in the 
previous sections by analyzing the display of smart city ideology in a specific empirical setting. Specifically, 
we chose the city of Genoa as a convenient case due to its increasing involvement in smart cities initiatives 
and because it symbolizes more than other cities the neoliberal roots of the smart city utopia and its 
shortcomings. 
We draws from many sources of data in order to provide an overview of the development of the smart city 
utopia in the Genoa case. The study focuses on the years from 2010 - when an association was formed to 
translate the smart city utopia- to the present, and relies on local and national documents, including 
administrative documents, newspaper articles, discourses, public speeches, and minutes of the Genoa’s city 
council. European and international documents and newspaper articles have been also included in the 
analysis to show that the Genoa’s case conforms to a trend of global diffusion.  
 
4. The neoliberal ideology behind utopia: the Genoa case.  
 
Genoa, the capital of Liguria, is the largest seaport in Italy and one of the European biggest city in the 
Mediterranean. Once part of the Italian industrial triangle together with Milan and Turin, Genoa’s economy 
has been bolstered for years by the shipyards and steelworks sectors (Guano, 2015).  
Starting from the ‘70s, the exposure to international business competition and the more recent recession 
forced the Genoa’s administrations to look for new economic opportunities (Galdini, 2005). Capital of 
European Culture program of 2004, the city was granted the UNESCO World Heritage status in 2007 and 
has been protagonists of a series of promotional events in the last decades, such as the World Cup in 1990, 
the Colombian Expo of 1992, the G8 summit in 2001 (Guano, 2015).  
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The smart city utopia emerged as expression of this urban regeneration strategy. Recognized as one of the 
top 15 smart cities in Italy (Galbraith, 2014), in June 2011, Genoa was the only city in Europe to be awarded 
funding in three different projects (the projects TRANSFORM, CELSIUS, and R2CITIES) in response to the call 
for proposals on “Smart Cities and Communities Initiatives”. Furthermore, the city of Genoa is the only 
Italian municipality that, in 2010, established an association to govern the smart city strategy in 
collaboration with national state-owned enterprises (Enel Distribuzione) and the University of Genoa 
(Galbraith, 2014). Public actors, business companies, and not-for- profit organizations are invited to join the 
Genoa Smart City Association (GSCA) to contribute to the transformation of Genoa into a smart city. 
 
The economic and political actors that comprise GSCA are those in charge not only of “planning the city of 
the future” (GSCA website), the smart city utopia, but they also set the direction of public policies and 
public money (EU funds for smart cities projects). Overall, GSCA is made up of 21.6% large companies (e.g., 
Siemens, Selex Elsag, Ansaldo Energia, Ericsson, ABB); 47.6% SMEs, 7.9% trade associations, 5.8% not-for-
profit organizations, while public bodies and research bodies represent respectively only 12.6% and 4.5% 
(Galbraith, 2014, 141). 
 
In line with the neoliberal principles, the role of the municipality in the process toward smartness involves 
“less government (or less rowing) but more governance (or more steering)” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, 46). 
In the words of Gloria Piaggio, director of the Smart City programme at the Genoa municipality: “once seen 
as mere bureaucratic agencies, municipalities are now shifting toward acting as planning offices” (Ulivieri, 
2012). GSCA appears as a “polycentric multi-sectorial stakeholder context” (Antiroikko et al., 2011, 3). In 
this context, the municipality relies on a network of organizations with multiple competencies in order to 
achieve public policy goals. The traditional hierarchical governance is sacrificed in the name of 
interdependent horizontal collaborations between public and private actors (Almquist et al., 2013). 
 
Changing national policies reflect this trend. To promote a more effective management of urban areas, Law 
134/2012 (art. 12Bis) appointed the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Urban Policy (CIPU) in charge of setting 
the Urban Agenda in accordance with that suggested by the European Commission on the cohesion policy 
2014/2020 (Sanseverino, 2014). The document “Priority methods and contents concerning Urban Agenda,” 
presented by the Ministry for Territorial Cohesion, indicates the smart city initiative as an area where new 
forms of collaboration and financing between public and private actors are emerging. The document 
suggests that the national Urban Agenda should foster these emerging partnerships by promoting the 
development of a “concerted and consensual” city planning (CIPU, 2013, 20). The document also shows 
that this model of city planning implies a limitation of the direct responsibility of the municipalities over the 
projects implemented in their territories due to the multiplicity of actors involved. For example, considering 
the 24 cities that manage the 22% of the entire amount of the European Regional Development Fund – 
ERDF (6 billion euros), municipalities have direct responsibility for implementation of the 25% compared to 
the 30% managed by business companies and other private actors (CIPU, 2013, 35). 
 
In this new changing environment, the role of the municipality of Genoa is still unclear and indefinite. In 
this respect, consider the meaningful exchange between city councilors Giovanni Vassallo and Clizia 
Nicolella, members of the political majority, during a meeting of the city council: 
 
Vassallo: “it is not the municipality that should do... that should make policies... if companies do not 
have a specific business interest in it... we are unable to make great strides." 
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Nicolella: “I strongly disagree with the idea that business companies should make policies… 
business companies should follow the policies decided by the municipality […] the role of the 
municipality in articulating and orienting the projects is essential […] Is the municipality powerful 
enough to direct the orientation of these powerful business interests?” (Minutes of City Council 
Meeting, 08 May 2013, translated by the authors) 
 
In line with national and international directives on city planning, the governance of GSCA shows the ascent 
of new actors (the new dominant class) in charge of developing the city of the future, the smart city utopia. 
The mission of GSCA is “to rethink the concept of the city, pursuing the concept of a concrete utopia in an 
urban space at human scale” (GSCA website, emphasis added). The rhetoric of smart city ideology is here 
fully deployed. An entrepreneurial ethos coupled with a celebration of competitiveness governs and orients 
the GSCA policies: 
 
The reference to intelligence comes from the use of a system which is able to take into account 
different variables and predict the effects of actions taken in both planning and management. […] 
Every action is related to an energy demand; in a smart city this relationship can be measured and 
made transparent […] the Smart City must be able to measure out the right amount of risk even in 
policy-making […] it is necessary to put in place measures that enable development and positioning 
at a competitive level. […]The first keyword relating to the Smart City is planning. (GSCA website) 
 
This call for measurement and competition, reveals the legacy of the neoliberal view of the smart city 
programme. The smart ideology discourse is also in place to justify and legitimize the financial funds 
management of GSCA, which fosters a competitive environment: 
 
All lines of financing are being redirected in a smart sense, introducing a rewards system in tender 
competitions for those who employ innovative technologies, methods of energy savings and 
contribute to improvements in the quality of life. (GSCA website; emphasis added) 
 
Smartness is identified with a general concept of innovation and with a substantial use of technologies 
precisely those technologies that the economic actors involved in this process of enhancing the public good 
are able to provide. The benefits that these economic actors can obtain from this involvement are huge. 
The global smart city technology market is expected to be worth more than $27.5 billion annually by 2023, 
compared to $8.8 billion in 2014 (Woods and Gartner, 2013).  
 
However, this utopian description of Genoa as a “living lab” serves to conceal another reality: that Genoa 
as a city subject to an indiscriminate urbanization that have dramatically increased the geohydrological risk 
of the area.  
 
In the last 40 years, the region of Liguria has been one of the regions most affected by landslides and floods 
(Research Institute for Hydrogeological Protection IRPI-CNR, 2015). Important inundation events affected 
the city of Genoa in October 1970, September 1992 and September 1993 (see Tab. 1). 
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Tab. 1: Impacts from the major storm events in Genoa from 1970. Source: Faccini et al. (2015) 
 
 
In October 2014, after torrential rains, the Genoa’s rivers, Bisagno, Fereggiano and Sturla, flooded causing 
one fatality. The damage to public infrastructure was estimated at some 250 million euros. In the 
aftermath, the international news agency Reuters commented: “the impact of storm and landslide damage 
has been exacerbated in recent years by unregulated building and the poor state of some public 
infrastructure” (Balsomini, 2014). Despite the climate change plays a key role with respect to 
geohydrological risks, “the complete and irrational urbanization of valley ﬂoors seems, however, the most 
striking aspect” (Faccini et al., 2015, 2648; see Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1: Final stretch of the Bisagno stream at the beginning of the 19th century (left panel) and in the present day (right 
panel). Source: Faccini et al. (2015) 
 
This process of mismanaged urbanization dates back to the 60s: 
 “At that time, not only did Genoa have to surrender its pleasant western seaside neighborhoods to 
shipyards and highly polluting factories, but its cityscape was also marred by a rationalization of 
urban space (see Lefebvre 1978) that consistently prioritized industrial production and the interests 
of developers over residents’ wishes and needs” (Guano, 2015, p. 164). 
 
The deindustrialization process that interested the area since the ‘80s has not coincided with a limitation of 
this phenomenon that remains one of the most compelling problem of the area (Sansa and Preve, 2008).  
The issue of hydrogeological instability is one of the challenges that the smart city utopia is planning to 
solve. Technology and innovation are welcomed as the panacea of all troubles. Meaningful in this regard is 
the declaration made by Gloria Piaggio in an interview with a national newspaper: 
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[The journalist]: Will the smart city also improve the ability of the area to withstand these weather 
events? 
[Gloria Piaggio]: The hydrogeological is one of the major themes [hemes [themes that if there were 
technologies such as sensors or communication with citizens via smartphones…we could have 
avoided the victims. Selex and Toshiba are working on how to monitor the area and prevent similar 
incidents, and we participate in the European project HARMONISE, which has just this purpose. 
(Ulivieri, 2012) 
 
Actually, the ClouT (Cloud of Things for empowering the citizen clout in smart cities), a joint European-
Japanese ICT project, launched in July 2013 included Genoa among its participants with the development of 
a pilot application that should help citizens when facing emergencies. The application, called “I don’t risk”, 
obtains environmental and weather data from sensors and provides information through mobile devices to 
the citizens and to the civil-protection agency of Genoa in order to reduce concrete risk in critical 
situations. Similarly, the HARMONISE project aims at developing “sensor placement tool for security 
systems design” (SELEX Elsag, website).  
 
While these solutions can help reduce concrete risk for citizens in critical situations, they fail to provide the 
municipality with sound long-term preventive mechanisms that could collectively address the causes of the 
flood, such as poor urban planning. The business-led development of the smart city utopia favor the 
deployment of consequences-oriented technological solutions, in so doing diverting the attention away 
from the causal roots of the geohydrological risk (i.e. aggressive urbanization), the latter requiring a 
coherent policy development process. The Genoa case shows how “the current dominance of supply-driven 
smart city solutions often results in smart city strategies that are disconnected from their social context and 
fail to tackle a city’s problems in a cohesive way” (Angelidou, 2015, 104). 
 
In addition, the contemporary face of ideology that sees this growing involvement of private actors in the 
development of public policies creates more than a few problems in terms of democratic participation to 
the definition of the future city and public accountability (Smyth, 2012; Bovens, 2007). It is meaningful that 
in Italy, where the smart city ideology is more and more pervasive, only one person out of five knows the 
meaning of the term ‘smart city’ (ABB, 2012). With respect to the case of Genoa, it is worth noting that the 
Statute of the Genoa Smart City Association does not refer to any form of public consultation for the 
selection and implementation of the smart projects. Moreover, a proposal to revise the Statute in this spirit 
has been rejected by the City Council.  A participant explained:  
“It's complicated to ask the companies to do certain things because this association is not the 
Municipality of Genoa, is made by the Municipality of Genoa with the participation of a majority of 
third parties … We cannot ask these companies to make participatory processes” (Minutes of City 
Council Meeting, 14 May 2013, translated by the authors) 
 
Furthermore, do the private interests of the economic actors that are part of GSCA lead necessarily to an 
enhancement of the public good? Are they required to be accountable to the Genoa’s citizens they declare 
to serve? Quoting a speech of Tony Benn to the House of Commons (1998), the journalist E. Heathcote has 
effectively explained this issue: “What power have you got? Where did you get it from? In whose interests 
do you exercise it? To whom are you accountable? And how can we get rid of you? Once, those questions 
needed to be asked about governments; now they need to be asked of the global tech corporations who 
wield extraordinary lobbying power” (Heathcote, 2015). Democratic elections ensure the right of 
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communities to ask their elected representatives to account for how the public money is spent (Barton, 
2006). On the contrary, no accountability mechanisms exist requiring the new actors of the smart city to be 
accountable to its citizens.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study started with the analysis of the existing definitions of the smart city concept. Our first aim was to 
show how the discourse on smart city constructs the collective imagination of a common utopia. The 
promoters of the smart city paradigm used the term utopia because of its symbolic power. Indeed, this 
term recalls the revolutionary and emancipative effort of oppressed groups. Our paper adds to previous 
critical studies on the topic of smart cities (Hollands, 2015; Hollands, 2008; Greenfield, 2013; Vanolo, 2013; 
Kitchin, 2014; Marvin et al., 2015), by calling into question this definition of smart city as a concrete utopia 
and highlighting the neoliberal ideas and values underpinning this concept and how these are translated 
into practice. 
 
The paradox of Genoa, labelled “smart city” but protagonist of aggressive urban planning policies, shows 
the shortcomings of the smart city utopia and the way in which neoliberalism values influence its 
translation into practice. The smart city utopia serves the interests of big multinational ICT companies, 
while neglecting the need of political (not only technological) answers to public and common interests. It 
conveys neoliberal values and shapes urban problems by making visible some aspects while at the same 
time obscuring others. Thus, the emphasis on fancy technological solutions risks diverting attention away 
from issues, such as the broad impact of urbanization, that require a long-term “urban planning-based” 
approach driven by the political and ethical willingness of municipalities. 
To the neoliberal ideology calling for an increasing involvement of corporations in the definition and 
enactment of public policies, we oppose the need of a concrete utopia (Bloch, 1995) created and nourished 
by the civil society. What the promoters of smart city claim to be a concrete utopia prove to be on the 
contrary an abstract utopia, a sterile and decontextualized narrative that preserve existing relations of 
power, rather than challenging them. A concrete utopia should not result from a top-down imposition of 
“grand utopian visions of the ‘good’ city and ‘good’ citizenship” (Amin and Graham, 2004, 423), but from a 
democratic debate about public interest and from the development of a public space where citizens can 
share more than individual preferences and utility (Malsch and Paracini, 2013). Thus, this utopia would 
combine the aspirations of two alternative models, the progressist, “looking to the future and inspired by a 
vision of social progress” and the culturalist, “nostalgic in outlook [and] inspired by the vision of a cultural 
community” (Choay, 1969, 31). 
The business-led smart city utopia transforms the “political subjectivities of citizens” (Vanolo, 2016, 35). It 
is meaningful that the smart city discourse describes citizens as consumers rather than as political actors: 
“when developing a new smart city service, an extreme focus on the customer is needed” (Smart Circle Org. 
website). Citizens, as ‘consumers’ are required to express their opinions on the quality of services, as ‘data 
providers’, are both unconsciously and voluntarily involved in the ideation of these services. As expressed 
by Paola Testa, research director at Cittalia - European Research Center for Cities and Municipalities, there 
needs to be an “engagement of the citizens in addressing choices and decisions, both through sensors or 
the sharing via social network” (Il Sole 24 ore, 11 November 2012). On the contrary, we believe that citizens 
can play a more active role not only in shaping the characteristics of this utopia, but also in providing ideas 
for technological innovation, through civic hacking initiatives, and bringing about alternative forms of 
citizens  participation and engagement (Vanolo, 2016; Granier and Kudo, 2016; Capra, 2016). The 
contingent and temporary character of these initiatives risks to jeopardize their democratic potential 
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(Lodato and DiSalvo, 2016), hence the effort to stabilize over time “a specific sets of relationships between 
participants, skills, expectations and technologies” (Perng and Kitchin, 2015, 14) and “a commitment to 
establishing the contextual effectiveness of a solution” (Perng and Kitchin, 2015, 14) are necessary 
conditions for the development of a democratic-inspired utopia.  
 
As Crossley (2004, 89) noted, “the public sphere is one place where we can make a strong claim for the 
necessity of undistorted communication.” This process involves the development of “counterpublics” 
(Asen, 2000, 424; Fraser, 1990), discursive arenas where “emergent collectives” (Asen, 2000, 438) 
formulate alternative discourses and norms to reconfigure existing systems of power; hence, the necessity 
of overcoming the idea of a monolithic public sphere by recognizing and fostering a multiplicity of public 
spheres. 
In this process, cities have a role to play in enabling these counter-discourses through a wider discursive 
engagement of citizens in the development of the smart city utopia. The role of cities is to understand and 
listen to the counter-discourses of citizens, involving them in the definition of values and common goals 


































ABB, The European House-Ambrosetti (2012), Smart Cities in Italia: un’opportunità nello spirito del 
Rinascimento per una nuova qualità della vita. Retrieved 16 June 2015, from www.ambrosetti.eu 
Adams, R. 2010. Longing for a Greener Present: Neoliberalism and the Eco-city. Radical Philosophy 163. 
Ahvenniemi, H., Huovila, A., Pinto-Seppnello spirito del Rinascimento pWhat are the differences between 
sustainable and smart cities?. Cities, 60, 234-245. 
Almquist, R., Grossi, G., van Helden, G. J., and Reichard, C. (2013). Public sector governance and 
accountability. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 24(7itical Perspe 
Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). In Bren 
Brewster (Trans.) Lenin and philosophy and other essays, New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Anthopoulos, L. (2016). Smart utopia VS smart reality: Learning by experience from 10 smart city cases. 
Cities. 
Alvesson, M., and Skvesson,, K. (2009). Reflexive methodology: New vistas for qualitative research. Sage. 
Amin, A., and Graham, S. (1997). The ordinary city. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 22(4), 411-429. 
Angelidou, M. (2015). Smart cities: A conjuncture of four forces. Cities, 47, 95-106. 
Angelidou, M. (2014). Smart city policies: A spatial approach. Cities, 41, S3-S11. 
Antiroikko, A.V., Bailey, S.J., and Valkama P. (2011) Innovations in public governance in the western world. 
In A.V. Antiroikko, S.J Bailey, P. Valkama, (Eds.). Innovations in public governance. Amsterdam: IOS 
Press. 
Anthopoulos, L. (2016). Smart utopia VS smart reality: Learning by experience from 10 smart city 
cases.cCities. 
Asen, R. (2000). Seeking the  Seeking toin counterpublics. Communication theory, 10(4), 424-446. 
Balsomini, P. (2014). One dead in Italy as floods sweep through Genoa. Reuters. Retrieved 23 October 
2015, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/uk-italy-flood-idUSKCN0HZ1EH20141010 
Baron, M. (2012). Do we need Smart Cities for Resilience? Journal of Economics & Management, 10, 32nal o 
Barton, A. D. (2006). Public sector accountability and commercial-in-confidence outsourcing contracts. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19(2), 256A271. 
Bakhtin, M. (1984). Rabelais and his World (Vol. 341). Indiana University Press. 
Benn T. (1998). Speech to the House of Commons, 16 Nov 1998 (Hansard volume 319 column 685 fom 
7.20pm, Debate on: European Parliamentary Elections Bill). 
Bevir, M., and Rhodes, R. (2003). Interpreting British Governance. Psychology Press. 
Blanco, I. (2015). Between democratic network governance and neoliberalism: a regime-theoretical analysis 
of collaboration in Barcelona. Cities, 44, 123-130. 
Bloch, E. (1995). The principle of hope. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bovens, M. (2007). Public accountability. In E. Ferlie, L. Lynn, and C. Pollitt, (Eds.). The Oxford handbook of 
public management. Oxford Handbooks Online. 
Brenner, N., and Theodore, N. (2002a). From the he  alocalism he  the spaces of neoliberalism. In N. 
Brenner and N. Theodore (Eds.), Spaces of neoliberalism: Urban restructuring in North America and 
Western Europe (pp. v of neoliberalism: Urban 
Brenner, N., and Theodore, N. (2002b). Cities and the geographies of “actually existing 
neoliberalism”. Antipode, 34(3), 349-379. 
Campanella, T. (1602). The City of Sun. 
Capra, C. F. (2016). The Smart City and its Citizens: Governance and Citizen Participation in Amsterdam 
Smart City. International Journal of E-Planning Research (IJEPR), 5(1), 20-38. 
Caragliu, A., Del Bo, C., and Nijkamp, P. (2011). Smart cities in Europe. Journal of urban technology, 18(2), 
65 of  
 13 
Carvalho, L. (2015). Smart cities from scratch? A socio-technical perspective. Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 8(1), 43-60. 
Choay, F. (1969). The Modern City: Planning in the 19th Century. Trans. by Marguerite Hugo and George R. 
Collins (New York: Braziller, 1969). 
CIPU 43-60.ournal of Regions, Economy and Societypective. perspective. ective. isting neoliberalism”. sis of 
collaboration in Barcelona. kama, (Eds.). 
Cisco (2014). White paper. Smart City Readiness: Understand the Issues to Accelerate the Journey. 
Retrieved 12 March 2015, from http://www.cisco.com/web/strategy/docs/smart-city-wp-
732985.pdf.Cocchia, A. (2014). Smart and digital city: A systematic literature review. In Smart City 
(pp. 13-43). Springer International Publishing. 
Cretu, L. G. (2012). Smart Cities Design using Event-driven Paradigm and Semantic Web. Informatica 
Economica, 16(4), 57ca,  
Crossley, N. (2004). On systematically distorted communication: Bourdieu and the socio franalysis of 
publics. The sociological review, 52(s1), 88-112. 
Datta, A. (2015). New urban utopias of postcolonial India: ‘Entrepreneurial urbanization ’in Dholera smart 
city, Gujarat. Dialogues in Human Geography, 5(1), 3-22. 
Dyer, J. (2010). Hermeneutics. International Encyclopedia of Education (Third Edition), 63–68. 
Eagleton, T. (1996). Marxist literary theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Faccini, F., Luino, F., Sacchini, A., Turconi, L., and De Graff, J. V. (2015). Geohydrological hazards and urban 
development in the Mediterranean area: an example from Genoa (Liguria, Italy). Natural Hazards 
and Earth System Sciences, 15(12), 2631-2652. 
Ferrara, E. (2014). Si chiama "Rinascimento digitale" nel piano anche il wifi in tutte le scuole. La 
Repubblica.it. Retrieved 20 October 2015, from 
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2014/10/24/si-chiama-rinascimento-
digitale-nel-piano-anche-il-wifi-in-tutte-le-scuoleFirenze05.html?ref=search 
Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing 
democracy. Social text, 56-80. 
Fuggetta, A. (2012). La citt: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy.o-digitale-nel-
piano-anch. Ecoscienza 5. Retrieved 03 March 2015, from 
http://www.arpa.emr.it/cms3/documenti/_cerca_doc/ecoscienza/ecoscienza2012_5/ecoscienza 
5_2012_smart.pdf 
Gadamer, H. G. (2004). Truth and method. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. 
Galbraith, B. (Ed.) (2014): Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
(ECIE) 2014. 
Galdini, R. (2005). Urban Regeneration Process. The Case of Genoa, an example of Integrated Urban 
Development Approach. Presented at the 45th Congress of the European Regional Science 
Association "Land Use and Water Management in a Sustainable Network Society" Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam 23-27 August 2005. 
Glasmeier, A., and Christopherson, S. (2015). Thinking about smart cities. Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society 2015, 8, 3–12. 
Granier, B., & Kudo, H. (2016). How are citizens involved in smart cities? Analysing citizen participation in 
Japanese`` Smart Communities''. Information Polity, 21(1), 61-76. 
Greenfield, A.  (2013)  Against the Smart City. New York: Do Publications. 
Guano, E. (2015). Touring the Hidden City: Walking Tour Guides in Deindustrializing Genoa. City & Society, 
27(2), 160-182. 
Guarneros-Meza, V., and Geddes, M. (2010). Local governance and participation under neoliberalism: 
Critical perspectives. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34, 115natio 
 14 
Habermas, J. (1990). A review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method. In Ormiston G. and Schrift A. (Eds.) The 
Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur (pp. 213-244). Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 
Habermas, J. (1971) Knowledge and human interests. Beacon Press, Boston. 
Hackworth, J. (2007), The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 
Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Harvey, D. (2000). Spaces of hope. Berkeley. 
Harvey, D. (1989). From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in 
late capitalism. Geografiska Annaler 71 B.1, 3–17. 
Heathcote, E. (2015). The dark heart of a smart city. GQ. Retrieved 20 October 2015, from http://www.gq-
magazine.co.uk/comment/articles/2015-02/11/the-dark-heart-of-a-smart-city 
Hertzler, J. O. (1923). The History of Utopian Thought. Macmillan, New York, pp. 1-2. 
Hollands, R. G. (2015). Critical interventions into the corporate smart city. Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 8(1), 61-77. 
Hollands, R. G. (2008). Will the real smart city please stand up? Intelligent, progressive or entrepreneurial? 
City, 12(3), 303-320. 
Il Sole 24 ORE, (2014). Smart trepreneurial? ity please stand upRetrieved 20 October 2015, from 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/tecnologie/2014-12-17/smart-e-chi-smart-fa-citta-e-progetti-
063946.shtml?uuid=ABJQPwRC&fromSearch 
IBM (2011). IBM, for a Smarter Planet and Smarter Cities. Retrieved 10 September 2015, from 
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/topics/smarter cities/ 
Kitchin, R. (2014). Making sense of smart cities: addressing present shortcomings. Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society, rsu027. 
Kornberger, M., and Carter, C. (2010). Manufacturing competition: how accounting practices shape strategy 
making in cities. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 23(3), 325ng, A 
Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing new worlds: a role for social and environmental accounting and auditing. 
Accounting, Organizations and society, 24(3), 217-241. 
Lodato, T. J., & DiSalvo, C. (2016). Issue-oriented hackathons as material participation. New media & 
society, 18(4), 539 –557. 
Malsch, B., and Guénin-Paracini, H. (2013). The moral potential of individualism and instrumental reason in 
accounting research. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 24(1), 74-82.  
Marvin, S., Luque-Ayala, A., and McFarlane, C. (Eds.). (2015). Smart urbanism: Utopian vision or false 
dawn?. Routledge. 
Meijer, A., and Boles on Accounting, 23 d Governing the smart city: a review of the literature on smart 
urban governance. International Review of Administrative Sciences. 
Mora, L., Bolici, R., & Deakin, M. (2017). The First Two Decades of Smart-City Research: A Bibliometric 
Analysis. Journal of Urban Technology, 1-25. 
Neirotti, P., De Marco, A., Cagliano, A. C., Mangano, G., and Scorrano, F. (2014). Current trends in Smart 
City initiatives: Some stylised facts. Cities, 38, 25-36. 
N 25-36.3, H., N H., N.3, L., and Melander, P. (2006). US  (2006contractr ). US performance management 
models in a Danish environment. Financial Accountability & Management, 22(3), 213-233. 
Pamula, A., Gontar, Z., and Gontar, B. (2013). Deployment of Smart City Concept in Poland. Selected 
Aspects. Organizacijų Vadyba: Sisteminiai Tyrimai, 67, 39-51. 
Peck, J. (2013). Explaining (with) neoliberalism. Territory, Politics, Governance,e1(2), 132-157. 
Peck, J., and Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing space. Antipode, 34(3), 380-404. 
Perng, S. Y., & Kitchin, R. (2015). Solutions, strategies and frictions in civic hacking. Paper presented at 
MediaCity 5, 1st- 3rd May, 2015, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK 
 15 
Rayner, K. (2015). Smart Cities Lead To Smarter Citizens. Forbes. Retrieved 20 October 2015, from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2015/01/16/smart-cities-lead-to-smarter-citizens/ 
Ricoeur, P. (1986). Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Sansa F. e Preve M. (2008). Il Partito del cemento - Politici, imprenditori, banchieri. La nuova speculazione 
edilizia. Chiarelettere, Roma. 
Sanseverino, E. R. (Ed.). (2014). Smart Rules for Smart Cities: Managing Efficient Cities in Euro-
Mediterranean Countries (Vol. 12). Springer. 
Santangelo, M. (2016). A (more?) intelligent city. Nóesis, 25(49_1), 65-77. 
Smart City Project. (2013). Retrieved 20 October 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/eip/smartcities/. 
Smyth, S. (2012). Contesting public accountability: a dialogical exploration of accountability and social 
housing. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23(3), 230-243. 
Söderström, O., Paasche, T., and Klauser, F. (2014). Smart cities as corporate storytelling. City, 18(3), 307-
320. 
Swyngedouw, E. (2005). Governance innovation and the citizen: the Janus face of governance-beyond-the-
state. Urban studies, 42(11), 1991-2006. 
Taylor, C. (1991). The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Taylor, C. (1985) Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Thompson, J. B. (1990). Ideology and modern culture: critical social theory in the era of mass 
communication. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Van Dijk TA. Ideology. A multidisciplinary approach. London: Sage; 1998. 
Vanolo, A. (2016). Is there anybody out there? The place and role of citizens in tomorrow’s smart 
cities. Futures, 82, 26-36. 
Vanolo, A. (2013). Smartmentality: The smart city as disciplinary strategy. Urban Studies. 
Ulivieri, V. (2012). Smart city: a Genova approda la sostenibilitegyLaStampa.it. Retrieved 20 October 2015, 
from http://www.lastampa.it/2012/11/30/scienza/ambiente/green-news/smart-city-a-genova-
approda-la-sostenibilita-95Jksdj1f8z25zXBqEOm1I/pagina.html 
Warner, M. E. (2012). Privatization and urban governance: The continuing challenges of efficiency, voice 
and integration. Cities, 29, S38-S43. 
Watson, V. (2013). African urban fantasies: dreams or nightmares?. Environment and Urbanization, 26(1), 
215ent . 
Weber, M. (1905).The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
Wiig, A. (2015). IBM's smart city as techno-utopian policy mobility. City, 19(2-3), 258-273. 
Woods, E., and Gartner, J. (2013). Navigant research leaderboard report: smart city suppliers, Navigant 
Consulting. Retrieved 10 September 2015, from 
https://www.navigantresearch.com/research/navigant-research-leaderboard-report-smart-city-
suppliers. 
 
